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As part of the government response to the Deepwater Horizon
blowout, a Well Integrity Team evaluated the geologic hazards of
shutting in the Macondo Well at the seaﬂoor and determined the
conditions under which it could safely be undertaken. Of particular
concern was the possibility that, under the anticipated high shut-in
pressures, oil could leak out of the well casing below the seaﬂoor.
Such a leak could lead to new geologic pathways for hydrocarbon
release to the Gulf of Mexico. Evaluating this hazard required anal-
yses of 2D and 3D seismic surveys, seaﬂoor bathymetry, sediment
properties, geophysical well logs, and drilling data to assess the
geological, hydrological, and geomechanical conditions around
theMacondoWell. After the well was successfully capped and shut
in on July 15, 2010, a variety of monitoring activities were used to
assess subsurface well integrity. These activities included acquisi-
tion of wellhead pressure data, marine multichannel seismic pro-
ﬁles, seaﬂoor and water-column sonar surveys, and wellhead
visual/acoustic monitoring. These data showed that the Macondo
Well was not leaking after shut in, and therefore, it could remain
safely shut until reservoir pressures were suppressed (killed) with
heavy drilling mud and the well was sealed with cement.
oil spill | underground blowout | overpressure | reservoir modeling |
marine geophysics
Since the early days of the Deepwater Horizon crisis, BP haddrawn up plans for ending the blowout of the Macondo Well
by locking a new mechanical device capable of shutting in the
ﬂow from above on top of the failed blowout preventer. The use
of such a device—a capping stack—was discussed among the
government and BP scientists and engineers as equipment was
being mobilized on the seaﬂoor for Top Kill during May of 2010.
When Top Kill failed, this capping stack became a leading
contender for controlling the spill (discussion of well control
efforts is in ref. 1).
In mid-June, a Well Integrity Team (WIT) was created to
make recommendations to the government on whether a shut in
of the Macondo Well could be safely undertaken and if so, under
what conditions. The WIT consisted of the authors of this paper
plus engineers from the Department of Energy National Labo-
ratories: Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore. Although
the WIT analyzed both the geologic environment of the Macondo
Well and the hydraulic and mechanical performance of engi-
neered components of the well (wellhead, casing ﬂow paths,
rupture disks, etc.), this paper deals only with geologic aspects of
well integrity. In this paper, we summarize the WIT’s assessment
of the geologic risks of shutting in the Macondo Well and provide
analyses of wellhead pressure and geophysical monitoring data
during shut in. These analyses were essential for determining
whether the capping stack, when closed, could remain safely shut
until the well was killed. Geologic data analyzed by the WIT came
from the Macondo Well and nearby wells (including relief wells)
and consisted of in situ stress and ﬂuid pressure measurements,
geophysical logs, core, cuttings, and gas analyses, 3D and 2D
seismic lines, seaﬂoor bathymetry, water-column imagery, side-
scan sonar surveys, and drilling records. Extensive discussions were
also carried out with scientists and engineers from BP, industry
experts, and other federal agencies and academia on lithologic and
structural interpretations, reservoir and geomechanical analyses,
oceanographic conditions, and well kill and cementing procedures.
Geologic Setting and Risks of Shutting In the Well
The Macondo (MC 252–1) Well is located ∼50 mi (80 km) east–
southeast of the Mississippi River Delta in a region of the
deepwater Gulf of Mexico experiencing very rapid sedimenta-
tion. The Macondo oil reservoir lies at a depth of about 18,000 ft
(5,500 m) below sea level in channelized turbidite deposits
(sandstones) of middle Miocene age (M56 unit) (Fig. 1A). The
upper portion of the well, which received the attention of the
WIT, penetrates poorly consolidated shale, mudstone, siltstone,
sandstone, and marl of Pleistocene through late Miocene age.
The rapid deposition of ﬁne-grained, low-permeability sediments
creates an overpressured scenario commonly encountered in the
Gulf of Mexico (2, 3), with pore ﬂuid pressure increasing steadily
with depth at a rate substantially greater than the oceanic (sea-
water) hydrostatic gradient (Fig. 1C). These high pore pressures,
when coupled with the low intrinsic shear strength of these clay-
rich sediments, lead to very low differential stresses (4). Through-
out much of the Macondo Well, the pore pressure is, thus, only
∼600 psi (4.1 MPa) less than the fracture pressure, which is the
pressure at which the least principle stress is exceeded and a hy-
draulic fracture is formed (5). The fracture pressure, in turn, is
only ∼500 psi (3.5 MPa) less than the overburden stress (Fig. 1C).
One of several possible pathways for hydrocarbon ﬂow within
the Macondo Well after the April 20, 2010 blowout was through
the annulus between the production casing and the outer casing/
liner strings (Fig. 1B). When Top Kill failed, BP engineers per-
formed a rapid analysis of possible reasons why the large volumes
of mud pumped down the well failed to halt the upward ﬂow of
hydrocarbons. One reason, postulated by BP, was that rupture
disks in the 16-in well liner had burst during the initial explosion,
allowing mud from the Top Kill to ﬂow into surrounding for-
mations. This situation might have been exacerbated through en-
largement of the rupture disk housings by erosion after the blowout.
If annular ﬂow was occurring and any of the rupture disks in the
Author contributions: S.H.H., P.A.H., W.D.M., C.B.E., P.H.N., L.A.M., T.C.W., K.M., and
M.K.M. evaluated hazards and helped design monitoring program; S.H.H., P.A.H., W.D.M.,
C.B.E., P.H.N., L.A.M., T.C.W., K.M., and P.B.F. analyzed data and interpreted results; S.H.H.,
P.A.H., W.D.M., C.B.E., P.H.N., and M.K.M. were members of the Well Integrity Team
stationed in Houston; and S.H.H., P.A.H., W.D.M., C.B.E., P.H.N., L.A.M., T.C.W., P.B.F.,
and M.K.M. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
1To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: hickman@usgs.gov.
2Present address: NEPTUNE Canada, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada V8W 2Y2.
20268–20273 | PNAS | December 11, 2012 | vol. 109 | no. 50 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1115847109
16-in liner had, indeed, failed, then shutting the well in at the
capping stack would lead to an underground blowout (6) when
pressure outside the 16-in liner exceeded the formation fracture
pressure just below the 18-in liner shoe at 8,969 ft (Fig. 1 B and
C). In this scenario, a hydraulic fracture would initiate at the 18-
in liner shoe and propagate upward until it was either arrested by
shallower geologic units (see below) or broached the seaﬂoor. In
the latter case, the consequences would be disastrous.
An underground blowout that broaches the seaﬂoor can lead to
large releases of hydrocarbons or other ﬂuids into the ocean. Such
releases would be very difﬁcult to contain. A broach can occur at
some distance from the wellhead, such as during the 1969 Santa
Barbara blowout (7), the 2008 Tordis, North Sea incident (8), and
the 1974 and 1979 Campion Field, Brunei blowouts (9). A broach
can also occur close to the wellhead. In the Macondo case, this
broach could lead to soft-sediment erosion along the outside of the
cemented casing/liner strings, with serious implications for wellhead
stability (1).Undergroundblowouts leading to surface broaches and
extensive cratering have also been reported in association with
drilling of geothermal energy wells (10) and steam ﬂood operations
in oil sands (11) and have been implicated in formation of the Lusi
mud eruption in East Java (refs. 12 and 13 and references therein).
The WIT also analyzed 3D marine multichannel seismic re-
ﬂection data that were acquired in 1999 and reprocessed by BP in
2008–2009 using prestack depth migration. Numerous seismic
images taken from these data were examined to assess (i) the
approximate geometry and volume of the Macondo Reservoir,
(ii) the geometry and characteristics of faults near the well that
might act as hydrocarbon pathways in the event of a lack of well
integrity, and (iii) the geological formations surrounding the well,
including the amount of shallow sand units, which might affect up-
ward hydraulic fracture growth in case of an underground blowout.
Interbedded sandstones and shales, if sufﬁcient in volume and
lateral extent, can inhibit or arrest vertical hydraulic fracture growth
through associated stress contrasts, low-strength interfaces, or ﬂuid
leak-off into the high-permeability sands (14–16). However, analysis
of well logs, drilling records, and predrilling 3D seismic sections by
the WIT indicated that the volume and lateral extent of sands
penetrated by the Macondo Well were probably insufﬁcient to
signiﬁcantly slow down the growth of a hydraulic fracture to the
seaﬂoor. Thus, for maximum safety, the WIT assumed a worst case
scenario of unrestrained vertical hydraulic fracture growth when
providing recommendations to the government on well integrity
during shut in.
Well Integrity Test and Analysis of Shut-In Pressure
To evaluate the risks of an underground blowout and possible
seaﬂoor broach, the WIT recommended that BP be allowed to
shut the Macondo Well in for a limited-duration well integrity
test. After considering a variety of reservoir, wellbore ﬂow/
leakage, and hydraulic fracture propagation models, government
and BP scientists agreed on a protocol for the test that would use
Fig. 1. (A) Schematic lithologic section for the Macondo Well based upon analysis of data acquired during drilling (Source: BP). Depths are total vertical
depth (TVD) below the Deepwater Horizon rig ﬂoor [75 ft (23 m) above mean sea level]. (B) Completion diagram for the Macondo Well showing outer nested
casing and liner strings cemented in place during drilling and production casing cemented across the Macondo Reservoir (M56 sand, yellow). Possible oil ﬂow
paths during the blowout are shown in red, which were either inside the production casing, between the production casing and the outer casing/liner strings,
or both. (Based on data from ref. 30.) (C) Approximate in situ pore pressure, fracture pressure, and overburden stress proﬁle for the Macondo Well showing
that pore ﬂuid pressures at the Macondo site are overpressured relative to a seawater hydrostat. The blue line shows the approximate oil pressure in the
wellbore corresponding to a capping stack pressure of 6,600 psi, which was observed several hours after the well was shut in (calculated for an oil pressure
gradient in the well of 0.25 psi/ft). (Modiﬁed from ref. 31. Overburden stress and oil pressure gradient from BP.).























wellhead pressure after shut in (as measured by accurate pres-
sure gauges installed within the capping stack) as a proxy for the
integrity of the well. If the pressure after shut in leveled off at
less than 6,000 psi (41 MPa), the government and BP agreed that
the well needed to be reopened within 6 h. The well in that case
was thought to be clearly losing pressure somewhere below the
seaﬂoor, probably through burst and highly eroded rupture disks,
and hydrocarbons were likely leaking into surrounding formations.
However, if the well shut-in pressure exceeded 7,500 psi (52 MPa),
then the test could continue for at least 48 h. In this case, the well
was showing integrity, and it was likely that it could be safely shut
in from above for a longer period. If the pressure was between
these two values, the scientists and engineers would face a di-
lemma, with at least two possible explanations for the results. One
explanation was that some of the rupture disks failed and that the
well was slowly leaking into surrounding formations. Another
explanation was that the reservoir was more depleted than origi-
nally anticipated, thus causing the shut-in pressure to be lower
than expected. Both the government and BP agreed that, if the
shut-in pressure leveled off between 6,000 and 7,500 psi, the well
integrity test could safely last for 24 h, even with a slowly leaking
well, to try to determine which of the above explanations was the
correct one.
The government and BP seized on a fortuitously long window
of stable weather in mid-July to install the capping stack, and the
well integrity test began on the afternoon of July 15, 2010. The
shut-in procedure consisted of a series of valve turns separated
by 10-min rest periods to reduce the oil discharge rate to zero in
a stepwise fashion. Several hours after the ﬁnal turn of the valve
was completed and the well was fully shut in, the pressure in the
capping stack rose to about 6,600 psi (46 MPa) (Fig. 2). Al-
though the pressure continued to rise slowly, it became evident
that 7,500 psi (52 MPa) would not be reached, and the well in-
tegrity test result fell squarely in the uncertain middle range. BP
interpreted the shut-in pressure to indicate a well with integrity
that was tapping a reservoir that had been depleted more than
originally anticipated and argued that the well should remain
shut in after the initial 24-h test period. However, the govern-
ment took an abundance-of-caution approach and reasoned that,
because a leak was possible, the well should be reopened to the
Gulf of Mexico after 24 h to avoid the risk of an underground
blowout. The government decided that keeping the well closed
beyond 24 h would require additional analysis to support the
subsurface integrity of the well.
This additional analysis was carried out overnight from July 15
to July 16 in the form of independent reservoir modeling by the
WIT to see if capping stack pressures measured immediately
after shut in could be explained without invoking leakage below
the seaﬂoor. The US Geological Survey model MODFLOW (17)
was used to simulate pressure buildup during the ﬁrst 6 h of shut
in. Although MODFLOW was originally designed to simulate the
ﬂow of groundwater in aquifers, it can also be used for simulating
the ﬂow of oil in reservoirs under single-phase and isothermal
conditions. Details of the MODFLOW implementation are given
in ref. 18. Because limited information was available about the
lateral extent of the reservoir, it was assumed to occupy a square
area centered on the Macondo Well and bounded by imperme-
able sides. This simpliﬁed representation was considered ade-
quate, because the model would initially be used to simulate only
the ﬁrst 6 h after shut in. During this period, pressure recovery
occurred in the close vicinity of the well, and the shut-in pressure
was insensitive to the location of the reservoir boundaries. Res-
ervoir and ﬂuid properties values used in the model were supplied
by BP during previous meetings and included reservoir perme-
ability, porosity, compressibility, and volume in addition to oil
viscosity and density. These property values are considered pro-
prietary data and are not presented here.
The reservoir model was used to simulate the scenario in
which the well had perfect integrity, with no leakage after shut in.
Starting with an initial equilibrium condition, the model simu-
lated 86 d of oil discharge from the Macondo Well at a constant
rate of 55,000 bbl/d (8,700 m3/d), consistent with estimates
available at that time from the Flow Rate Technical Group (19).
At the end of 86 d, the shut-in procedure using the capping stack
was simulated by six uniform step decreases in discharge rate to
reach zero discharge. This simulated shut-in procedure was only
intended to approximate the actual procedure, because the actual
decreases in discharge rate were not known until after subsequent
analyses were made using the rating curve of the choke valve
within the capping stack.
Fig. 2 compares the measured and simulated pressures in the
capping stack on July 15, 2010. The step-like rises in pressure
correspond to successive turns of the valve to choke back the oil
discharge rate. After full shut in was achieved with the ﬁnal valve
turn, the simulated shut-in pressure quickly approached the ob-
served shut-in pressure of 6,600 psi (46 MPa). The close match
between observed and simulated pressures indicated that there was
a reasonable scenario in which the MacondoWell had full integrity
(i.e., no leakage after shut in), but the oil reservoir had been sig-
niﬁcantly depleted during the blowout. Although the possibility of
a leak could not be ruled out, the decision was made by the gov-
ernment to extend the shut in beyond 24 h, with reevaluation of
that decision at regular intervals. At this same time, an intense
geophysical surveillance effort (described below) was begun to
monitor for signs of leakage from the well. Wellhead pressure and
geophysical monitoring data were independently reviewed and dis-
cussed by BP and the government oversight team, initially at 6-h
intervals and then at 12- and 24-h intervals, to determine if the well
should remain shut in. If signs of leakage were detected, then the
Macondo Well would be immediately reopened.
As shut in continued beyond 24 h, additional shut-in pressure
data were used to update the reservoir model. After about 2 d of
shut in, it became apparent that the initial model needed to be
revised. A Horner plot analysis (20) of the pressure data (Fig. 3)
indicated that the oil reservoir could be more appropriately
modeled as a long, narrow channel instead of a square. This
revised reservoir geometry was more consistent with the known
geology of the Gulf of Mexico and the depositional setting of the
Macondo Reservoir (21).
Fig. 2. Wellhead pressure measured during and immediately after closure
of the capping stack on the Macondo Well on July 15, 2010 as measured by
pressure gauges installed on the capping stack (PT_3K_1 and PT_3K_2). The
pink line denotes pressure simulated by the initial (square) reservoir model
assuming a well with no leaks. (Modiﬁed from ref. 18 with permission of the
National Ground Water Association, Copyright 2011.)
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With the availability of additional shut-in pressure data every
24 h, the reservoir model was revised on a near real-time basis by
adjusting the width and length of the reservoir channel and the
location of the Macondo Well to improve the ﬁt between sim-
ulated and observed shut-in pressures. The reservoir permeability
and the formation compressibility were also adjusted, but these
measurements remained within ranges typical of reservoir sands.
The oil discharge rate used in the model was also revised from
55,000 to 50,000 bbl/d (from 8,700 to 7,900 m3/d), the most up-to-
date estimate by scientists from the Department of Energy Na-
tional Laboratories during late July of 2010. Model parameters
were estimated using the program PEST (22), which enabled
considerations of uncertainties in estimated parameters and pro-
jected shut-in pressures. With increasing availability of pressure
data as shut in continued, the model was able to ﬁt the shut-in
pressures, and the uncertainty in projected pressure narrowed.
The pressures simulated by the revised model closely match the
observed pressures through August 3, 2010, when ﬁnal well kill
and cementing operations began (Fig. 3). The good ﬁt between
observed and simulated pressures throughout this shut-in period
provided continued support for the idea that the Macondo Well
had maintained its integrity.
Geophysical Monitoring During Shut In
An extensive geophysical monitoring plan was implemented to
independently assess the integrity of the Macondo Well during
shut in and place additional constraints on possible leakage rates
into surrounding geologic formations. Monitoring was carried out
by BP and their contractors as well as researchers from the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire and the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA). It included acquisition of
multichannel 2D seismic proﬁles, seaﬂoor and water-column sonar
surveys, wellhead visual monitoring with remotely operated vehi-
cles, and wellhead acoustic/seismic monitoring. As discussed above,
these data (along with the reservoir modeling results) were reviewed
at regular intervals during shut in to decide if the Macondo Well
should be reopened.
The feasibility of using seismic proﬁling to monitor for leaks
below the seaﬂoor was examined by ﬂuid substitution modeling.
At the request of the WIT, ﬂuid substitution modeling was per-
formed by BP for hypothetically 20-ft-thick (6-m-thick) sand with
28% porosity. This model would simulate the replacement of
water by gas or oil within permeable sand, such as the M110 lo-
cated just above the 18-in liner shoe (Fig. 1 A and B). Using in situ
gas and oil properties appropriate to the Macondo Reservoir,
models were generated representing sand layers ﬁlled with brine,
oil, and gas. The oil- and gas-ﬁlled cases produced signiﬁcantly
lower P-wave velocities and densities than the brine-ﬁlled case.
This analysis indicated that, if there were permeable sands at
or above the 18-in liner shoe available to absorb hydrocar-
bons during an underground blowout, then the reﬂection seismic
data should have recorded a decrease in acoustic impedance of
that sand.
Before shutting in the Macondo Well, a contract was estab-
lished between BP and a marine seismic reﬂection company for
the acquisition and processing of repeated (i.e., time lapse) 2D
seismic lines before and after the Macondo Well was shut in to
look for signs of subseabed leakage. The ﬁrst such line was
recorded on July 13, 2010 by the vessel Geco Topaz 2 d before
shut in. After shut in, a total of 28 additional 2D seismic lines
were successfully recorded, processed, and interpreted. Because
of the urgency of the task at hand, as many as four seismic lines
were acquired per day along ﬁve different transects (Fig. 4A,
Inset), with processing and interpretation typically completed in
24 h. Had the Macondo Well been leaking hydrocarbons below
the seaﬂoor, the time-lapse 2D seismic reﬂection data should
have seen this leakage in the form of either an accumulation of
oil and/or gas in sand layers (charge zones) or seismic indications
of an upward migration of hydrocarbons. As shown by the ex-
ample in Fig. 4, features that were sought but not found in these
time-lapse seismic surveys included (i) increased seismic ampli-
tudes associated with reversed-polarity reﬂections off a growing
charge zone, (ii) diffraction patterns (seismic chimneys) from a
rising column of hydrocarbons, and (iii) an increase in two-way
travel time to a particular reﬂector (seismic pull down) resulting
from sediment disruption and charging (examples in refs. 23–25).
Careful comparison of the 29 2D seismic lines that were exam-
ined during the shut-in period with 2D and 3D seismic surveys
acquired before shut in failed to detect these types of features on
any of transects through the Macondo Well.
At the level of the 18-in liner shoe [8,894 ft (2,711 m) below
sea level], the dominant frequency of the 2D seismic data ac-
quired before and after the Macondo Well was shut in was 40 Hz,
which was similar to the dominant frequency of the exploration
3D seismic data at equivalent depths. The average seismic ve-
locity at this depth was estimated to be 6,240 ft/s (1,900 m/s),
corresponding to a wavelength of 156 ft (48 m). Assuming a 1/8
wavelength detection threshold suggests that a seismic anomaly
with a vertical thickness of ∼20 ft (6 m) or greater should have
been detectable. At the same depth, the horizontal resolution (as
given by the Fresnel zone after migration) is 39 ft (12 m), which
is one common midpoint (cmp) in this data. It was estimated that
a minimum of 3 cmp or ∼120 ft (37 m) horizontally were needed
to detect and interpret an anomaly.
Using a horizontal detection threshold of 150 ft (46 m), which
is slightly greater than 3 cmp, the WIT calculated the minimum
volume of leaked hydrocarbons that could be imaged with seis-
mic reﬂection. Two geometries were assumed for the lateral
extent of hydrocarbons in the 20-ft-thick (6-m-thick) M110 sand:
(i) a circular region centered on the well or (ii) an elliptical
region with a 10:1 aspect ratio fed by a vertical hydraulic fracture
located midway between two seismic lines. The amount of oil
contained within such a region, subject to assumptions regarding
the amount of gas dissolved in the oil and the water saturation,
ranged from ∼6,000 to 14,000 bbl. Because no anomaly had been
detected by the 11th day after shut in, the leak rate could be no
more than ∼1,300 bbl/d. Thus, the conclusion reached was that
Fig. 3. Horner plot (20) of wellhead pressure after closure of the capping
stack on the Macondo Well until ﬁnal well kill and cementing operations
began August 3, 2010. The period of oil discharge (tp) before closure is 86 d,
and Δt is the elapsed time since full shut in on July 15, 2010. The bottom
horizontal axis is plotted on a log scale that increases to the left, and there-
fore, time increases to the right (top horizontal axis). Diamond symbols show
shut-in pressure measured by the pressure gauge PT_3K_2. The line shows
the simulated shut-in pressure calculated by the revised model, in which the
oil reservoir is represented by a long channel. (Modiﬁed from ref. 18 with
permission of the National Ground Water Association, Copyright 2011.)























the Macondo Well either had no leak at the 18-in liner shoe or
had a leak less than ∼1,300 bbl/d, which is below the level of
detectability with high-resolution seismic methods.
In late May and early June, scientists from the University of
New Hampshire were deployed on the NOAA vessels Gordon
Gunter and Thomas Jefferson in the vicinity of (but not over) the
Macondo wellhead to map the distribution of the submerged
oil plume. This plume survey was performed using conductivity,
temperature, and depth sensors equipped with ﬂuorometers, dis-
solved oxygen sensors, and water sampling bottles (26, 27). These
vessels were also used to explore the feasibility of using split-beam
18- and 38-kHz ﬁsheries sonars to acoustically map the deep oil
plume and its impact on biological scatterers in the water column
(28). Before shut in on July 15, numerous natural gas seeps were
detected within the area surrounding the Macondo wellhead by
the NOAA vessels. These natural seeps were manifest in split-
beam sonar images as streams of gas bubbles extending from the
seaﬂoor to within several hundred meters of the sea surface, the
closest being at a distance of ∼4 km east–southeast from the
Macondo wellhead. After the wellhead was capped, the NOAA
vessels Pisces, Gordon Gunter, and Henry Bigelow (with the same
sonar systems onboard) were tasked with monitoring the area
surrounding the wellhead out to a distance of several kilometers
for indications of gas rising through the water column. These
surveys were repeated throughout the shut-in period and intended
to detect the ﬁrst signs of an impending seaﬂoor broach from the
very gas-rich Macondo Reservoir oil. No seaﬂoor broach was
found, but the sonar mapping did discover acoustic targets ema-
nating from the wellhead (Fig. 5). The acoustic behavior of
these targets was characterized by intermittent emanations rising
to a depth of ∼500–700 m below the sea surface and then dis-
appearing. This behavior implied that the targets were hydrate-
coated methane bubbles (29) and/or pieces of methane hydrate
forming on and then breaking away from the wellhead cap.
Subsequent visual inspection by remotely operated vehicles found
the source of both the bubbles and the methane hydrate for-
mation (which was also seen at the wellhead) to be a small leak
Fig. 4. (A Inset) Location map showing transects for seismic lines acquired to test for leakage of the Macondo Well below the seaﬂoor after closure with the
capping stack. (A) 2D seismic section acquired by the vessel Geco Topaz along line 1 on July 13, 2010 (2 d before closing the capping stack and shutting in the
well). Approximate horizontal and vertical scales are shown, with the latter derived from two-way travel time (twt) and a sediment velocity model. (B) Same
as in A but acquired on July 19, 2010 (4 d after the well was shut in). Within each section, the projection of the Macondo Well and locations of the various
liner/casing shoes are shown as a yellow line and triangles, respectively.
Fig. 5. Track line of the NOAA vessel Pisces for July 26–29, 2010 shown
superimposed on an oblique view of seaﬂoor topography surrounding the
Macondo Well. Three different NOAA vessels (Pisces, Gordon Gunter, and
Henry Bigelow) provided near-continuous sonar coverage over and around
the Macondo Well during shut in to look for evidence of gas emanations
that might be related to leakage from the well, but only this track line is
shown for clarity. The acoustic curtain shown reﬂects a small stream of gas
bubbles rising from the Macondo wellhead on July 27, 2010 (discussed in the
text). Depth contours are at 100-m intervals, and vertical exaggeration is 7×.
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from a ﬂange-to-ﬂange metal seal in the blowout preventer/
capping stack assembly, which was judged to be inconsequential.
Wellhead seismic and acoustic data were also recorded during
shut in by BP using a three-component geophone (8-Hz corner
frequency) and hydrophone clamped onto the 36-in conductor
casing just above the seaﬂoor. It was thought that these data
might reveal ﬂuid ﬂow either within the wellbore or behind
casing or might detect brittle failure of casing or cement, thereby
helping to diagnose the subsurface integrity of the well. Data
from these sensors were analyzed during shut in by the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and the US Geological Survey, and
no anomalous seismic or acoustic signals were observed.
Conclusions
Basedon theabsenceof signiﬁcant subseaﬂoorwell leakage indicated
by both hydrologic modeling of wellhead pressures and geophysical
monitoring during shut in, it was concluded that the Macondo Well
could remain safely shut in with the capping stack from July 15 to
August 3, 2010, when kill and cementing operations were initiated
from the top of the Macondo Well (1). These operations were fol-
lowed by the intersection of the Macondo Well with the ﬁrst relief
well and subsequent execution of plug-and-abandon procedures on
the Macondo Well, which were completed on November 8, 2010.
The ability of the WIT to function effectively and make useful
scientiﬁc recommendations to government leaders during this
time of national crisis required the following components. (i) An
unprecedented level of collaboration and coordination among
scientists, engineers, and emergency response ofﬁcials from public
and private sectors. (ii) Clear protocols for information requests
to minimize disruptions to BP and their subcontractors, with
a well-deﬁned chain of command for decision-making processes.
(iii) Very rapid analysis of diverse datasets, often in a matter of
hours, including concise synthesis and communication of results to
key decision makers. (iv) Posting of government scientists at BP
headquarters to verify critical observations and discuss mitigation
options and possible outcomes. (v) Continual access to personnel
with the training and expertise needed to deal with critical sci-
entiﬁc and technical issues both on- and off-site. (vi) Excellent
access to company data, analyses, and mitigation plans for use by
government oversight teams and their collaborators.
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